Effectiveness means the capability to carry out state functions such as providing security or levying taxes. Legitimacy means the support of important groups of the population. A state that retains one of these two aspects is not failed as such; however it is in great danger of failing soon if nothing is done. He identifies five possible pathways to state failure:.
Although Goldstone identifies pathways to state failure he is quick to warn about simplifying the issue. Often re -building either legitimacy or effectiveness implies a trade off with the other aspect of the state. Since these states are missing one of the two pillars to stability, it is dangerous to initiate such a trade-off as it takes time to rebuild trust from the population. Although state failure has been studied for decades by numerous scholars, it remains a contested concept vulnerable to political, ideological and economical agendas.
The measurement methods of state failure are generally divided into the quantitative and the qualitative approach. Quantitative measurement of state failure means the creation of indexes and rankings underlying certain indicators. However, a number of other indexes are generally used to describe state weakness, often focusing on the developmental level of the state. The Index categorizes states in four categories, with variations in each category. The Alert category is in dark red, Warning in orange, Stable in yellow and Sustainable in green. The FSI total score is out of , and in there were states making the ranking.
Initially, the FSI only ranked 75 countries in The FSI uses two criteria by which a country qualifies to be included in the list: first of all, the country must be a United Nations member state, and secondly, there must be a significant sample size of content and data available for that country to allow for meaningful analysis. There are three groupings: social, economic and political with overall twelve indicators. The indicators each count for 10, adding up to a total of However, in order to add up to , the indicator scores are rounded up-or-down to the nearest one decimal place.
Finland is currently the most stable and sustainable country in the list. While it is important to note that the FSI is used in many pieces of research and makes the categorization of states more pragmatic, it often receives much criticism due to several reasons. Firstly, it does not include the Human Development Index to reach the final score, but instead focuses on institutions to measure what are often also considered human aspects for development.
Secondly, it parallels fragility or vulnerability of states with underdevelopment. This comparison firstly assumes that underdevelopment economic creates vulnerability, thus assuming that if a state is "developed" it is stable or sustainable. Thirdly, it measures the failure or success of a state without including the progress of other areas outside the sphere of the 12 indicators, thus excluding important measures of development such as the decline in child mortality rates, and increased access to clean water sources and medication, amongst others.
The qualitative approach embraces theoretical frameworks. Normally, this type of measurement applies stage models to allow a categorisation of states. In three to five stages, researchers show state failure as a process. Notable researchers, inter alia, are Robert I. Ulrich Schneckener's stage model defines three core elements, monopoly of violence , legitimacy and rule of law. The typology is based on the security first logic and thus, shows the relevance of the monopoly of violence in comparison to the other two while at the same time acting as the precondition for a functioning state.
The first type is directed towards functioning states; all core functions of the state are functioning in the long term. In weak states, the monopoly of force is still intact, but the other two areas show serious deficits. Failing states lack the monopoly of force, while the other areas function at least partially. Finally, collapsed or failed states are dominated by parastatal structures characterised by actors trying to create a certain internal order, but the state cannot sufficiently serve the three core elements. Both research approaches show some irregularities.
While the quantitative approach lacks transparency concerning its indicators and their balancing in the evaluation process of countries, the qualitative approach shows a diversity of different foci. One of the major discrepancies is the question whether all the stages have to be taken continuously or if a state can skip one phase. Schneckener stresses that his model should actually not be interpreted as a stage model as, in his opinion, states do not necessarily undergo every stage.
Robert I. Rotberg's model underlies an ordinal logic and thus, implies that the state failure process is a chronological chain of phases. Charles Tilly argued that war-making was an indispensable aspect of state development in Europe through the following interdependent functions:. Tilly summarized this linkage in the famous phrase: "War made the state, and the state made war.
Similarly, Herbst added that a war might be the only chance to strengthen an extraction capability since it forced rulers to risk their political lives for extra revenue and forced subjects to consent to pay more tax. It is also important for state development in that the increased revenue would not return to its original level even after the end of wars. Contrary to European states, however, he also pointed out that most Third World states lacked external threats and had not waged interstate wars, implying that these states are unlikely to take similar steps in the future.
Steward and Knaus tackled a question "can intervention work? Still, it is important to highlight that developed nations and their aid institutions have had a positive impact on many failed states.
The concept of the failed state is thereafter often used to defend policy interventions by the West. Further, as Chesterman and Ignatieff et. Therefore, effective state- building is a slow process and it is disingenuous to suggest otherwise to domestic publics. Pritchett, Woolcock and Andrews analyzed the systematic failure of the development of failed states. They defined "state administrative capability for implementation" as the key aspect of state development, and found out the mechanism in which failed states stumbled regardless of decades of development practices tried, billions of dollars spent, and alleged "progress" boasted.
These countries adopted the following techniques which led to undermine it:. In light of the fact that many of these countries would likely need centuries to reach the state capability of developed countries, they suggested creating "context-specific institutions", promoting "incremental reform process", and setting "realistic expectations" for attaining the goal of substantial development.
Foreign aid produces several unintended consequences when used to develop the institutional capacity of state. Donors will often delegate aid spending to recipient governments since they do not have the information or capacity to identify who is in the greatest need and how it can be best spent. Moss, Todd, Gunilla Pettersson, and Nicolas Van de Walle acknowledged the controversy over the effect of foreign aid that has developed in recent years. Berman, Eli, Felter, Shapiro, and Trolan also found similar evidence to support the paradox, stating that large US aid attempts in African agriculture have only resulted in further conflict between citizens.
Furthermore, Binyavanga Wainaina likens Western aid to colonization, in which countries believe that large cash contributions to spur the African economy will lead to political development and less violence. In reality, these cash contributions do not invest in Africa's growth economically, politically and most of all, socially. James Fearon and David Laitin suggest that the problem of failed states can be addressed through a system of "neotrusteeship," which they compare to "postmodern imperialism.
Fearon and Laitin start with the assumption that failed states comprise a collective action problem. Failed states impose negative externalities on the rest of the international system, like refugees who are displaced by war.
Fragility and the State – ACCORD
It would be a net good for the international system if countries worked to develop and rebuild failed states. However, intervention is very costly, and no single nation has a strong enough incentive to act to solve the problem of a failed state. Therefore, international cooperation is necessary to solve this collective action problem. Fearon and Laitin identify four main problems to achieving collective action to intervene in failed states:.
Fearon and Laitin do propose some solutions to these problems. To solve the recruitment problem, they argue for having a powerful state with security interests in the failed state to take the lead in the peacekeeping operations and serve a point role. Having a single state lead the peacekeeping operation would also help solve the coordination problem. Empowerment of a UN body to investigate human rights abuses would solve the accountability problem.
Finally, forcing the failed state to contribute funds to peacekeeping operations after several years can reduce the incentives of the peacekeepers to exit. Fearon and Laitin believe that multilateral interventions which solve the above four collective action problems will be more effective at rebuilding failed states through neotrusteeship. Jeremy Weinstein disagrees that peacekeeping is necessary to rebuild failed states, arguing that it is often better to allow failed states to recover on their own.
One of Weinstein's key arguments is that war leads to peace. By this, he means that peace agreements imposed by the international community tend to freeze in place power disparities that do not reflect reality. In such an environment, corrupt governments, crooked systems of justice and weak property rights are inevitable.
Somalia and the secessionist territory of Somaliland offer one of the best contrasts between state building using imported institutional pillars, and state building using indigenous ones. The international community has tried no fewer than 15 times since the dissolution of the Somali state in to rebuild it in a top-down fashion — and 15 times it has failed.
In contrast, Somaliland, which declared independence from Somalia in , has built its state institutions by adopting a bottom-up approach that takes advantage of long-standing and widely accepted clan structures. Offered little external help, it has been forced to depend on its own resources, capacities and institutions.
Today, it is the most democratic state in the region and has established enough stability and prosperity to attract migrants from around the Horn of Africa. Yet the international community refuses to recognize Somaliland and persists in its Sisyphean efforts to forge a centralized Somali state. After decades of war and predatory regimes, Uganda is rebuilding itself from the bottom up. Villagers in Rhino, northern Uganda, elect their local council representatives.
Most Western policy makers and practitioners today pay lip service to the idea that states will not prosper unless they are built by local people using local resources, but the great majority of development projects continue to be designed around a generic model of state building and to be implemented with inadequate attention to the local social, cultural and institutional context.
Many fragile states have political geographies, infrastructures and governance capacities that make the standard Western model of state building with its top-down state structures and strong emphasis on formal institutions and methods of holding officials accountable highly problematic. National leaders have little incentive to serve distant areas populated by disparate groups because they are viewed more as competitors for state power than as compatriots. The inability of governments of large centralized states to project authority much beyond their capital cities — due to thin road networks, limited administrative resources and weak nationwide societal bonds undercut the capacity of governments to project authority and serve their populations.
Unsurprisingly, stability continues to elude the DRC. But even in more compact countries there is a need to find ways to take advantage of indigenous capacities — and narrow the gap between informal and formal institutions. One of the reasons fragile states have such difficulty in constructing effective systems of governance is that their foreign-imposed formal institutions are weak, and they conflict and compete with — and lose to — the informal institutions that drive much behaviour.
In such environments, an enormous gap separates a small cadre that manipulates or controls the state, and the general population, who are highly ambivalent at best towards their own government.
Western policy has if anything only reinforced these trends. A new approach to state building. States deeply enmeshed with their surrounding society — financially dependent, geographically appropriate, institutionally synchronized and socio-culturally representative — are far more likely to be well governed than those detached from their citizens. The peoples of Africa, the Middle East, Latin America and Central Asia have enormous political, socio-economic and cultural resources, built up over centuries, that can serve as the foundation for political, economic and social development.
What they most need in terms of outside assistance are innovative forms of state building that take advantage of those resources. This does not mean that conventional, Western political models have no relevance to non-Western societies, but it does mean that those models need to be adapted to accommodate indigenous governance models, patterns of behaviour, needs, realities and capacities.
International actors must place far more emphasis on seeking locally appropriate solutions for problems of governance, land and resource management and knowledge transfer if their assistance is ever going to translate into locally propelled — and thus sustainable — development. The goal should not be centralized states with Western-style laws and a democracy defined solely in terms of regular elections.
Instead, aid agencies should strive to promote capable, inclusive, participatory, responsive and accountable governments, no matter what form they take. One way to accomplish this is to channel foreign aid away from corrupt and centralized governments and towards locally accountable entities, both governmental and non-governmental. But she is surely also right to condemn capital transfers that do nothing except sustain African despots and stifle entrepreneurship.
Foreign cash has its place in kick-starting development, but only if it is used in politically astute ways that reinforce the natural accountability mechanisms of society and that do not prop up shell-like government organs unresponsive to the needs of their own citizens. The debate sparked by Dead Aid has also called attention to the fact that foreign assistance comes in many forms other than financial.
Another change that Western agencies need to embrace is attitudinal. If foreign assistance is to become a catalyst for state building, Westerners must adopt a far more humble and longer-term perspective. Doing so will give them the opportunity to discover exactly how best to target aid to enhance a broad range of governing capacities, both formal and informal, modern and traditional. Indigenous institutions. From the Persian Gulf to Latin America, countries have sought to bolster their legitimacy and effectiveness by integrating various aspects of indigenous institutions — such as land tenure arrangements, customary law and traditional symbols — into formal mechanisms of governance.
The international community must encourage similar steps if its aid programmes are to empower local people. Forcing indigenous peoples in Latin America to learn Spanish, say, or obliging non-Arabs in African countries to use Arabic often disadvantages — and even disenfranchises — large segments of the population.
In many cases, the best chance for leveraging local capacities and institutions and improving governance will be to focus on building up local governments and tying them as closely as possible to their local communities.
Rethinking state building
In some cases especially in rural areas and small cities this may mean trying to integrate governing structures and laws with traditional identities and social codes, and including chiefs and village elders where they retain strong legitimacy. But in many large cities whose populations are diverse and increasingly divorced from their traditional roots, the best way to introduce accountability into state organs is to structure them around greatly empowered urban administrations. One should not idealize local governments. For example, after decades of war and predatory regimes, Uganda has sought to rebuild itself from the bottom up by empowering local councils.
It is based on lessons learnt from close studies of the nations where the state has been most developed in the region, in Eastern and Southern Africa. The book provides and responds to the most recent and up-to-date information on African development and uses insights of people who have lived and worked in the continent for most of their lives. Editor s :. Publication Place:.