Resources for anti-realism Time Traveler! Explore the year a word first appeared. Dictionary Entries near anti-realism antiradical anti-rape anti-rational anti-realism anti-recession anti-recessionary anti-Red. Time Traveler for anti-realism The first known use of anti-realism was in See more words from the same year. Comments on anti-realism What made you want to look up anti-realism?
Get Word of the Day daily email! Test Your Vocabulary. Love words? Need even more definitions? Ask the Editors On Contractions of Multiple Words You all would not have guessed some of these A Look at Uncommon Onomatopoeia Some imitative words are more surprising than others Literally How to use a word that literally drives some people nuts. Is Singular 'They' a Better Choice? Take the quiz Musical Words Quiz A quiz in common time. Take the quiz Spell It Can you spell these 10 commonly misspelled words?
Play the game. Contrary to holism, justification is built up and broken down across limited sets like the anabolic and catabolic processes that maintain homeostasis in the cells, organs and systems of the body. It is the coordination of choristic sets of reliably produced beliefs that create the greatest flourishing given the limitations inherent in the situated agent. Bayesian Reasoning, Misc in Philosophy of Probability.
Belief Revision, Misc in Epistemology. Epistemic Virtues in Epistemology. Epistemology of Mind, Misc in Philosophy of Mind. Foundationalism and Coherentism in Epistemology. Reliabilism about Knowledge in Epistemology. According to an argument by Colin Howson, the no-miracles argument is contingent on committing the base-rate fallacy and is therefore bound to fail. We demonstrate that Howson's argument only applies to one of two versions of the no-miracles argument.
The other, more considerate version is not adequately reconstructed in Howson's approach and thus remains unaffected by his line of reasoning.
We provide a Bayesian reconstruction of this version of the no-miracles argument and show that it is valid. We then proceed Direct download 9 more. Direct download 2 more. I offer a meta-level analysis of realist arguments for the reliability of ampliative reasoning about the unobservable. We can distinguish form-driven and content-driven arguments for realism: form-driven arguments appeal to the form of inductive inferences, whilst content-driven arguments appeal to their specific content.
After regimenting the realism debate in these terms, I will argue that the content-driven arguments are preferable. Scientific realism and anti-realism are most frequently discussed as global theses: theses that apply equally well across the board to all the various sciences. Against this status quo I defend the localist alternative, a methodological stance on scientific realism that approaches debates on realism at the level of individual sciences, rather than at science itself. After identifying the localist view, I provide a number of arguments in its defense, drawing on the diversity and disunity found in the sciences, as well I also show how the view is already at work, explicitly or implicitly, in the work of several philosophers of science.
After meeting the objections that localism collapses either into globalism or hyperlocalism, I conclude by sketching what sorts of impacts localism can have in the philosophy of science. Extensional scientific realism is the view that each believable scientific theory is supported by the unique first-order evidence for it and that if we want to believe that it is true, we should rely on its unique first-order evidence. In contrast, intensional scientific realism is the view that all believable scientific theories have a common feature and that we should rely on it to determine whether a theory is believable or not.
Fitzpatrick argues that extensional realism is immune, while intensional I reply that if extensional realism overcomes the pessimistic induction at all, that is because it implicitly relies on the theoretical resource of intensional realism. I also argue that extensional realism, by nature, cannot embed a criterion for distinguishing between believable and unbelievable theories.
Direct download 6 more. The second part of the paper presents a critical taxonomy of the most important positions and doctrines in the contemporary literature on the domains of science and mathematics: scientific realism, scientific anti-realism, constructive empiricism, structural realism, mathematical Platonism, mathematical indispensability, mathematical empiricism, intuitionism, mathematical fictionalism and second philosophy. Realism and Anti-Realism, Misc in Metaphysics. But the reason Carnap takes a dismissive attitude to metaphysics is a matter of controversy.
The argument there assumes verificationism, but I will argue that his argument survives the rejection of verificationism. The root I will argue that this remains a powerful challenge to metaphysics that has yet to be adequately answered. Carnap: Confirmation and Verification in 20th Century Philosophy. Carnap: Epistemology in 20th Century Philosophy. Carnap: Ontology in 20th Century Philosophy.
Logical Empiricism in 20th Century Philosophy. Prior Probabilities in Philosophy of Probability. Many realists argue that present scientific theories will not follow the fate of past scientific theories because the former are more successful than the latter. Critics object that realists need to show that present theories have reached the level of success that warrants their truth. I reply that the special theory of relativity has been repeatedly reinforced by unconceived scientific methods, so it will be reinforced by infinitely many unconceived scientific methods.
This argument for the special theory of relativity overcomes It is shown that, contrary to the literature, both can be understood as historically informed but logically validmodus tollensarguments. After specifying the question relevant to underdetermination and showing why empirical equivalence is unnecessary, two types of competitors to contemporary scientific theories are identified, both of which are informed by science itself. With the Second, I provide an overview of the key developments in the debate concerning scientific realism over the past decade.
Third, I provide a summary of the other contributions to this special issue. Convergent Realism in General Philosophy of Science. Direct download 5 more. Structural realists claim that we should endorse only what our scientific theories say about the structure of the unobservable world. Far from betraying the spirit of structural realism, the solution I present is available to any theorist who endorses this argument. Ramsey Sentences in General Philosophy of Science. Structural Realism in General Philosophy of Science. Direct download 4 more.
Refine your editions:
A prominent type of scientific realism holds that some important parts of our best current scientific theories are at least approximately true. According to such realists, radically distinct alternatives to these theories or theory-parts are unlikely to be approximately true. Thus one might be tempted to argue, as the prominent anti-realist Kyle Stanford recently did, that realists of this kind have little or no reason to encourage scientists to attempt to identify and develop theoretical alternatives that are radically distinct from In other words, it may seem that realists should recommend that scientists be relatively conservative in their theoretical endeavors.
This paper aims to show that this argument is mistaken.
While realists should indeed be less optimistic of finding radically distinct alternatives to replace current theories, realists also have greater reasons to value the outcomes of such searches. Interestingly, this holds both for successful and failed attempts to identify and develop such alternatives. Scientific anti-realists who appeal to the pessimistic induction PI claim that the theoretical terms of past scientific theories often fail to refer to anything. But on standard views in philosophy of language, such reference failures prima facie lead to certain sentences being neither true nor false.
Thus, if these standard views are correct, then the conclusion of the PI should be that significant chunks of current theories are truth-valueless. But that is semantic anti-realism about scientific discourse—a position most philosophers of Therefore, proponents of the PI confront a dilemma: either accept semantic anti-realism or reject common semantic views. I examine strategies with particular emphasis on supervaluations for the PI proponent to either lessen the sting of this argument, or learn to live with it.
Closing the Gaps4 Conclusion. Meaning, Misc in Philosophy of Language. Reference in Science in General Philosophy of Science. The most influential arguments for scientific realism remain centrally concerned with an inference from scientific success to the approximate truth of successful theories. Recently, however, and in response to antirealists' objections from radical discontinuity within the history of science, the arguments have been refined. Rather than target entire theories, realists narrow their commitments to only certain parts of theories.
Despite an initial plausibility, the selective realist strategy faces significant challenges. In this article, I outline four prerequisites for a successful selective Direct download 7 more. The theory is extremely successful despite being both inconsistent and not even approximately true. Direct download 11 more. Kyle Stanford has recently claimed to offer a new challenge to scientific realism. It explains why science falls short when it falls short, and However, this best account will be antirealist in some respects and about some theories.
It will not be a sweeping antirealism about all or most of science. The most robust account of scientific constraint on metaphysical theorizing is advanced by James Ladyman and Don Ross in their book Every Thing Must Go. Localism is the view that the unit of evaluation in the scientific realism debate is a single scientific discipline, sub-discipline, or claim, whereas individualism is the view that the unit of evaluation is a single scientific theory.
Localism is compatible, while individualism is not, with a local pessimistic induction and a local selective induction. Asay presents several arguments to support localism and undercut globalism, according to which the unit of evaluation is the set of all scientific disciplines.
Realism - The British Library
I argue Debates about the underdetermination of theory by data often turn on specific examples. Cases invoked often enough become familiar, even well worn.
- Governance and Security Issues of the European Union: Challenges Ahead!
- Business at a Crossroads: The Crisis of Corporate Leadership.
- Richard Widmark: A Bio-Bibliography (Bio-Bibliographies in the Performing Arts);
- Economic Development, Social Order, and World Politics: With Special Emphasis on War, Freedom, the Rise and Decline of the West, and the Future of East Asia?
- 2 editions of this work!
- Realism/Anti-Realism in 20th-Century Literature.
- Electrochemistry and corrosion.
However, as I argue here, the case is not genuinely underdetermined. We can easily imagine a possible experiment to decide the question. The fact that we would not perform this experiment is a moral, rather Evolutionary Biology in Philosophy of Biology. This paper argues against the common, often implicit view that theories are some specific kind of thing.
Instead, I argue for theory concept pluralism: There are multiple distinct theory concepts which we legitimately use in different domains and for different purposes, and we should not expect this to change. The argument goes by analogy with species concept pluralism, a familiar position in philosophy of biology. I conclude by considering some consequences for philosophy of science if theory concept pluralism is correct. Species Concepts in Philosophy of Biology. Direct download. Wikipedia is a free encyclopedia that is written and edited entirely by visitors to its website. I argue that we are misled when we think of it in the same epistemic category with traditional general encyclopedias.
An empirical assessment of its reliability reveals that it varies widely from topic to topic. So any particular claim found in it cannot be relied on based on its source. I survey some methods that we use in assessing specific claims and argue that the Sociology of Knowledge in Epistemology. Among the most serious challenges to scientific realism are arguments for the underdetermination of theory by evidence. This paper defends a version of scientific realism against what is perhaps the most influential recent argument of this sort, viz.
On this basis it is argued that the likelihood of a theory Evidence, Misc in Epistemology. Through the introduction of both memorable and controversial notions, such as paradigms, scientific revolutions, and incommensurability, Kuhn argued against the traditionally accepted notion of scientific change as a progression towards the truth about nature, and instead substituted the idea that science is a puzzle solving activity, operating under paradigms, which become discarded after it fails to respond accordingly to anomalous challenges and Incommensurability in Science in General Philosophy of Science.
Scientific Revolutions in General Philosophy of Science. Thomas Kuhn in 20th Century Philosophy. The paper concludes by showing what this talk may be profitably replaced with, namely specific claims concerning science that fall into the following categories: descriptive, evaluative, normative, There are two key advantages to this proposal. First, realism and its competitors may be understood to consist of highly nuanced variants. More particularly, one may accept that there are general claims concerning science in some of the identified categories, but deny that there are such claims in the others.
Constructive Empiricism in General Philosophy of Science. Scientific Progress in General Philosophy of Science. In contemporary philosophy of science, the no-miracles argument and the pessimistic induction are regarded as the strongest arguments for and against scientific realism, respectively. In this paper, I construct a new argument for scientific realism which I call the anti-induction for scientific realism.
It holds that, since past theories were false, present theories are true. I provide an example from the history of science to show that anti-inductions sometimes work in science. The anti-induction for scientific realism has several advantages over After decades of intense debate over the old pessimistic induction Laudan, ; Putnam, , it has now become clear that it has at least the following four problems.
First, it overlooks the fact that present theories are more successful than past theories. Second, it commits the fallacy of biased statistics. Third, it erroneously groups together past theories from different fields of science. Four, it misses the fact that some theoretical components of past theories were preserved. I argue that these four Retail realists advocate abandoning wholesale arguments, which concern the reality of theoretical entities in general, and embracing retail arguments, which concern the reality of particular kinds of theoretical entities.
They can thus be realists about some and anti-realists about others. But realism about a kind of entity can take different forms depending on how retail realists individuate kinds of entities. This chapter introduces the notion of the inclusiveness of individuation: the more inclusively we individuate a kind of entity, the more The form of realism that retail realists accept regarding a particular kind of entity can be more selective or more encompassing depending on how inclusively they individuate that kind of entity.
This chapter illustrates these ideas in terms of a case from the history of chemistry involving the hypothetical component of hydrochloric acid known as the muriatic radical. It has become apparent that the debate between scientific realists and constructive empiricists has come to a stalemate. Neither view can reasonably claim to be the most rational philosophy of science, exclusively capable of making sense of all scientific activities. Accordingly, several philosophers have attempted These efforts, however, seem to have failed.
In response, I suggest that philosophers of science should suspend the effort to determine which philosophy of science is best for everyone, and instead begin investigating which philosophy of science is best for specific people, with specific values, in specific contexts. I illustrate how this might be done by briefly sketching a single case study from the history of science, which seems to show that different philosophies of science are better at motivating different forms of scientific practice. Perhaps the strongest argument for scientific realism, the no-miracles-argument, has been said to commit the so-called base rate fallacy.
The apparent elusiveness of the base rate of true theories has even been said to undermine the rationality of the entire realism debate. In this paper, I confront this challenge by arguing, on the basis of the Kuhnian picture of theory choice, that a theory is likely to be true if it possesses multiple theoretical virtues and is embraced by numerous scientists, A success-to-truth inference has always been at the heart of scientific realist positions.
But all attempts to articulate the inference have met with very significant challenges. This paper reconstructs the evolution of this inference, and brings together a number of qualifications in an attempt to articulate a contemporary success-to-truth inference which is realistic. I argue that this contemporary version of the inference has a chance, at least, of overcoming the historical challenges which have been proffered to date.
However, there is Recent literature in the scientific realism debate has been concerned with a particular species of statistical fallacy concerning base-rates, and the worry that no matter how predictively successful our contemporary scientific theories may be, this will tell us absolutely nothing about the likelihood of their truth if our overall sample space contains enough empirically adequate theories that are nevertheless false.
In response, both realists and anti-realists have switched their focus from general arguments concerning the reliability and historical track-records of our Such a development however sits in tension with the usual understanding of the scientific realism debate as offering a second-order assessment of our first-order scientific practices, and threatens to undermine the possibility of a distinctive philosophical debate over the approximate truth of our scientific theories.
I illustrate this concern with three recent attempts to offer a more localised understanding of the scientific realism debate—due to Stathis Psillos, Juha Saatsi, and Kyle Stanford—and argue that none of these alternatives offer a satisfactory response to the problem. Recently, Fahrbach and Park have argued that the pessimistic meta-induction about scientific theories is unsound. They claim that this very argument does not properly take into account scientific progress, particularly during the twentieth century.