If an expansive and content-neutral standard for freedom of expression, for example, has not resulted in all fraudulent, hateful, obscene, conspiring, defamatory, commercial, or violent speech being entirely immune from state limitations, it is difficult to see how a more restrictive and purposive definition of press freedom, one that requires demonstration of a link to the underlying values and purposes of section 2 b , would be necessarily unwieldy.
I do not presume to have proposed the only or even the most effective freedom of the press framework here. It may turn out, upon reflection, that another framework is more workable or strikes a better balance between the constitutional and broader social interests at issue. The point is simply that such a legal framework is not beyond the reach of human creativity; constitutionalizing some press activity need not as a matter of logic lead indiscriminately to constitutionalizing every press activity, however unrelated to the distinct function of press freedom or however injurious to the public interest.
This conclusion becomes more compelling for those who accept that alternatives, such as a common law framework for journalist—source privilege, are inadequate substitutes for Charter scrutiny where the conduct in question implicates interests of constitutional importance, which the Court has repeatedly stated includes newsgathering. Respectfully, it would be incongruous for the Court to use a purposive definition to expand the limits of the Charter well beyond its literal text in some circumstances, only to refuse to give any meaningful and independent content or effect to those guarantees found expressly within its language.
It is more fruitfully seen as a substantive entitlement, in the absence of good reason to treat it as effectively superfluous or reiterative. Just as the freedoms of thought, belief, and opinion are concepts distinguishable from freedom of expression, the mere inclusion of freedom of the press within the same subsection as freedom of expression is a weak textual basis on which to presume the latter entirely assimilates the former. To put it bluntly, just as courts should be reluctant to read in constitutional provisions with no basis in the text of the Charter ,  so should they be reluctant to read them out where expressly guaranteed.
Chapter 2. Rights and Freedoms of Man and Citizen
While the analysis of directly expressive press activity may, in the main, continue to be treated under the general freedom of expression framework,  a purposive definition of section 2 b shields from undue state interference lawful activities integral to the functioning of a free press—most notably newsgathering—even if they do not fit naturally within the Irwin Toy analysis designed by and large for directly expressive activity.
Consider, for example, C. Although the access issues in this case stretch the logic of the open court principle—the court proceedings themselves were quite open to the press and public alike, and no obvious issues of state accountability arose  —the Supreme Court relied heavily on open court cases in concluding that the newsgathering activity in this case was protected. Relying on the general expressive freedom framework may have appeared natural as it was apparently uncontested in that case that filming, photographing, and interviewing in courthouse areas open to the press had the necessary expressive content to fall within the ambit of freedom of expression.
While this might be brushed off as a misreading, a comparable elision might have occurred in the case U. Similarly, while the Supreme Court did not focus much attention on the issue in C. This reading results in a potentially massive expansion of expressive freedom, insofar as it deviates from protecting activity that conveys or attempts to convey a meaning, to protecting all activity that in some way facilitates expression on some topic.
At the same time, this expansive interpretation of expressive freedom butts up against the holdings in cases such as National Post and C. For instance, the Court stated in C. What we seem to be left with, then, is a freedom of expression doctrine for which conduct must either convey or attempt to convey meaning  in order to be protected under the rubric of section 2 b , but with two or perhaps three exceptions.
Freedom of Press - Indian Constitution
First, in the courtroom and directly outside it , the ability to access or gather news and information is equated with expression—restrictions on access are, by virtue of that fact alone, considered restrictions on expression and violate 2 b. There is a deep conceptual thicket here that is well beyond the scope of this paper, but it suffices to say that further burdening the concept of freedom of expression, which may be at its saturation point, by including the conceptually distinct notion of press freedom may be unwise. Independent treatment of freedom of the press with regard to non-expressive activity most notably newsgathering , as proposed here, would allow the Supreme Court to offer constitutional protection in appropriate cases while neither bending the freedom of expression framework intended for cases in which the conduct being prohibited or restricted is itself expressive , nor sidestepping its strictures altogether through the ad hoc extension of protection.
Moreover, erasing any distinction between directly expressive activity and that which may facilitate future expression  may not bode well for a coherent approach to section 2 b that includes a meaningful role for press freedom. Speaking practically, while maximum access to information is a goal to be lauded in general, there may be situations in which a right to full public access would be problematic, but a right of access limited to those undertaking press-like functions may be perfectly viable. As Timothy Dyk has argued in the American context:.
Analyzing the situation in terms of expressive activity obscures the distinction between the different functions served by press and public access. The right being asserted is to have access to information, not to communicate it. By mischaracterizing newsgathering activity as expressive in nature, this approach allows press access only when the public has a right of access for expressive activity at the particular location and ignores the critical issue of whether special access for newsgathering should be permitted.
Providing discrete treatment to press freedom would serve the valuable objectives not only of promoting analytical clarity but also of focusing attention on what is really at stake in press freedom cases, on the interests to be protected, and on the reasons why—instead of simply throwing everything into the free expression and section 1 mix and seeing what comes out.
At this point, it is worth revisiting an objection raised by the Supreme Court in National Post. Protecting the function assumed by the claimant, as opposed to the claimant as a member of a class, would make freedom of the press like every other fundamental freedom available to everyone provided they are engaging in the protected activity. On this understanding, the preliminary constitutional issue is not whether the press should enjoy greater constitutional protection than others, nor whether extending constitutional protection in some circumstances requires extending it in all of them.
The scope and content of press freedom are important and difficult issues and have been at least in a preliminary fashion addressed above. The logically prior question is whether freedom of the press as specifically entrenched in the Charter has discrete and independent constitutional significance, and whether it protects at least some activity that is not directly expressive but is nevertheless instrumental to the values and purposes of section 2 b and the Charter more broadly.
Answering these questions is the purpose of both the above framework and, ultimately, a meaningful section 1 analysis. I do not doubt that there may be factors and circumstances unforeseen here that will require judicial deliberation, creativity, and caution. However, I have faith that our courts are up to the task of securing this long-overlooked freedom and ensuring that it is properly balanced with important social interests.
Without a doubt, the proposed framework, as with all other Charter rights and freedoms articulated at a high level of abstraction, will require drawing lines that have only been roughly sketched here. Who is engaged in press-like activity with a view to publication? What activity is inherently as opposed to only contingently or potentially harmful? What constitutes press activity that serves the public interest in line with the values underlying press freedom specifically and section 2 b more broadly? When has state action in fact amounted to a breach of press freedom?
When is an infringement nevertheless demonstrably justified? Should there be greater allowance in section 1 for information collected for certain purposes for example, to hold public officers and bodies to account than for others? And on and on as far as the imagination will permit. See e. Grant v Torstar , supra note 2 at para 2.
See also Dagenais , supra note 3 at , Gonthier J, dissenting; Mentuck , supra note 3 at para 27; Toronto Star , supra note 4 at para 7. See also Carson , supra note 4 at paras 18, 23—25; Lessard , supra note 5 at , LaForest J, concurring; Lessard , supra note 5 at —53, McLachlin J, dissenting; Edmonton Journal , supra note 3 at — Carson , supra note 4 at para 23; National Post , supra note 9 at para Edmonton Journal , supra note 3 at [emphasis added]; the Court notes that:.
Only then can they make an assessment of the institution. Discussion of court cases and constructive criticism of court proceedings is dependent upon the receipt by the public of information as to what transpired in court. Edmonton Journal , supra note 3 at Lessard , supra note 5 at See Edmonton Journal , supra note 3 at —40; Carson , supra note 4 at para Lessard , supra note 5 at — See also Moysa v Alberta Labour Relations Board ,  1 SCR , 60 DLR 4th 1 finding resolution of the constitutional issue unnecessary but assuming that newsgathering may be constitutionally protected under section 2 b.
The limited relevance of Branzburg in the context of the Charter will be dealt with more thoroughly in Part II. C, below. A similar trend is identifiable in the US context. By contrast, consider the unique treatment for press freedoms afforded by courts interpreting the freedom of expression guarantee in the European Convention on Human Rights, despite that document not containing any explicit mention of the press. Ibid at See also Lessard , supra note 5, McLachlin J, dissenting. Carson , supra note 4 at para 23 [emphasis added]. The value of checking the abuse of official power has been more thoroughly canvassed in the US context, but I suggest that the observations are broadly applicable to Canada.
See Chan, supra note 51 at — I do not use the term right to know as if it were an independently enforceable constitutional right see e. See Branzburg , supra note 36 at — Although finding in a concurring set of reasons that a journalistic privilege should be available on a case-by-case basis, Powell J also appeared to struggle with the issue. For a roughly representative sample, see e. See also West, supra note 40 at —56, and the sources cited in ibid at , n The difficulty of defining the press and imbuing it with special rights, privileges, or immunities played a role in the rejection of constitutional protection for newsgathering in National Post , as I discuss in more detail in Part III, below.
Branzburg, supra note 36 at This functional definition of the press has been endorsed, in various forms, by a wide range of US scholars and courts. See Von Bulow , supra note 73 at While this standard developed in the US case law, in the context of journalist—source privilege I think that it provides a sound basis for determining who is undertaking activity that the press guarantee is aimed at protecting more broadly.
See Part II, below. As Grant v Torstar involved the permissible content of expression, the desire to expand the defence—at least notionally—to all speakers was in my opinion entirely sensible. Grant v Torstar , supra note 2 at paras , I think the functional approach should embrace this proposition, but only with respect to those who are, in some sense and on the occasion in question, collecting and disseminating news. Subject, of course, to different treatment under section 1 depending on the circumstances, content, and form of the expression. See the e. Charter , supra note 1, ss 6 mobility rights are restricted to citizens , 23 language rights are restricted to French and English linguistic minorities , 35 aboriginal and treaty rights are restricted to Indian, Inuit, and Metis peoples.
On this point, see Abrams, supra note 53 at —81, who rejects the supposition that deciding who is and is not entitled to protection of press freedom amounts to licensing, any more than deciding who is and is not entitled to protection under religious freedom entails the licensing of religions. But see the discussion of the public interest requirement in Part II. A 3 , below. This standard contains both an activity element—newsgathering—and an element of intent—the purpose of collecting the information for dissemination to the public see Calvert, supra note 64 at See Benkler, supra note 64 at — See also e.
I suggest that the importance of the press, as defined above, is precisely to un veil. In turning facts into fiction, the author abandons the function of informing the public about news , as informative and important as such writing may be in another sense. But see e. A reporter may be conducting a vendetta through newsgathering for the purpose of publication. In such cases the courts would have to look at the intention of the news gatherer: if the information was not collected for the purpose of publication, but rather to blackmail or destroy the reputation of the politician clandestinely , such conduct would lack the purpose of publication, and thus any claim for protection would fail at this stage.
As our purpose here is to address protections for newsgathering as distinct from expression, we are not directly concerned with the publication of such false and damaging i. Whether a subjective intent element is preferable to an objective determination is a matter I leave aside. Thus, while the expression of false information may be protected as an aspect of freedom of expression see e.
Zundel , supra note 90; R v Lucas ,  1 SCR , DLR 4th , the collection and dissemination of clearly inaccurate information is likely not linked to the purpose of press freedom as such, and thus may not warrant constitutional protection under the proposed freedom of the press framework. Baker, supra note 64 at —63, noting that the functions of a newsgatherer and of an author of fiction are different, with only the former serving the purpose behind the privileged press protection.
Of course, a publication for which the information was being collected need not be exclusively factual to be protected, although it should contain at least some factual content to bring it within the purpose of the guarantee. See the discussion in the Conclusion, below. See Tsige , supra note Of course, merely declaring activity illegal would not necessarily defeat the press freedom claim at this stage, as the government could then immunize itself from scrutiny through a general prohibition e.
This would remove from protection inherently harmful activities like assault, trespassing, clear invasions of privacy i. This raises what appears to be a major practical impediment to discrete constitutional protection for press freedom: the possibility of major national security leaks receiving protection. For thoughtful discussion of the topic in the US context, see Benkler, supra note 64; Stone, supra note It should be noted, however, that press freedom as conceived here neither directly affects liability flowing from the relationship between the source and the government i.
This is not to say that the concern is not a real one, but rather that discrete constitutional protection for press freedom does not make the vexing issue of illegal transmission of government secrets significantly more difficult than it would otherwise be. Supra note 33 at para It is considered to be on occasion. Security of Information Act , supra note , s 4 3 prohibiting knowing receipt of secret information.
Again, however, this section could be reviewed for compatibility with press freedom under the freedom of the press doctrine articulated here. This is not to say that unseemly press activities unconnected to section 2 b values could not be protected elsewhere under the Charter , in particular under freedom of expression, just that they would not be protected under the freedom of the press framework proposed here.
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For US case law and analysis regarding this type of public interest criterion, see Baker, supra note 64 at —54, and his criticism of this approach at — See Grant v Torstar , supra note 2, especially at paras 99 — ; WIC Radio , supra note 2, especially at paras 29— On the dilution of the Oakes test, see e. Last year, we had anonymous letters being circulated among crime reporters which alleged corruption among senior IPS officers. Instead of publishing the information contained in those letters with the names of the IPS officers, we published a story on corruption and cronyism on IPS officers.
Accessing his account also amounts to violation of privacy. But, we only published the communication between him and some handlers in Pakistan, which we knew would have an impact on the investigation. Our job requires us to share information in the public domain, sometimes we would violate privacy.
Nonetheless, one has to be cautious. The PCI norms lay down the guidelines for reporting cases and avoiding trial by media. The PCI warns journalists not to give excessive publicity to victims, witnesses, suspects and accused as that amounts to invasion of privacy. Similarly, the identification of witnesses may endanger the lives of witnesses and force them to turn hostile. Zaheera Sheikh, who was a key witness in the Gujarat Best Bakery case, was a victim of excessive media coverage and sympathy.
Her turning hostile invited equal amount of media speculation and wrath. Her excessive media exposure possibly endangered her life. The right of the suspect or the accused to privacy is recognised by the PCI to guard against the trial by media. If an allegation is made in a court room, but is not supported by evidence or facts, then it is advisable that it be dropped from the report.
I did not report that, although I could have justified it by saying it is part of the petition, and I was just doing my job. The allegation was neither backed by facts nor was it of public interest. As a rule one should report on undisputed facts. Then again, with court reporting one is treading on safer grounds, as opposed to other beats. One should avoid a situation where facts revealed are offensive or reveal the identity of the victim.
The past history of both the victim and the accused should not be reported. She admitted, that "Media reporting often gives the impression that the accused has committed the crime or the media through its independent investigation wing has found a particular fact. When in fact, it has relied entirely on the information given by the police and failed to question or verify the facts by an independent source. The result is that most crime reporting is one-sided, because the information received from the police is rarely questioned.
Of course, as a journalist you do not want to lose out on a good story, but there needs to be gate keeping, which is mostly absent in most of the media today. The functions of the court in the civilised society cannot be usurped by any other authority. The court agreed that media awareness creates awareness of the crime, but the right to fair trial is as valuable as the right to information and freedom of communication.
The report, focussed on the pre-judicial coverage of a crime, accused and suspects, and how it impacts the administration of justice. The Contempt of Courts Act, under section 2 defines criminal contempt as:. Under Contempt of Court Act, publications that interfere with the administration of justice amount to contempt. Further, the principles of natural justice emphasise fair trial and the presumption of innocence until proven guilty. The rights of an accused are protected under Article 21 of the Constitution, which guarantees the right to fair trial.
This protects the accused from the over-zealous media glare which can prejudice the case. For instance, in the Jessica Lal murder case, the media took great pride in acting as a facilitator of justice. The media in the case whipped up public opinion against the accused and held him guilty even when the trial court had acquitted the accused. The media took on the responsibility of administering justice and ensuring the guilty are punished, candle light vigils and opinion polls on the case were organised by the media.
Past history of the accused was raked up by the media, including photographs of the accused in affluent bars and pubs in the city were published after he was acquitted. The photographs of Manu Sharma in pubs insinuated how he was celebrating after his acquittal. The Apex Court observed that the freedom of speech has to be carefully and cautiously used to avoid interference in the administration of justice. If trial by media hampers fair investigation and prejudices the right of defence of the accused it would amount to travesty of justice.
The Court remarked that the media should not act as an agency of the court. The Court, commented, "Presumption of innocence of an accused is a legal presumption and should not be destroyed at the very threshold through the process of media trial and that too when the investigation is pending. On 30 August, Live India, a news channel conducted a sting operation on a Delhi government school teacher forcing a girl student into prostitution. Later investigation and reports by the media exposed that there was no truth to the sting operation.
The girl student who was allegedly being forced into prostitution was a journalist. The sting operation was a stage managed operation. The police found no evidence against the teacher to support allegations made by the sting operation of child prostitution. In this case, the High Court of Delhi charged the journalist with impersonation, criminal conspiracy and creating false evidence.
Section 5 of the Cable Television Networks Regulation Act, and the Cable Television Network Rules hereafter the Cable Television Networks Act , stipulates that no programme can be transmitted or retransmitted on any cable service which contains anything obscene, defamatory, deliberate, false and suggestive innuendos and half truths.
The programme code restricts airing of programmes that offend decency or good taste, incite violence, contains anything obscene, defamatory, deliberate, false and suggestive innuendos and half truths, criticises, maligns or slanders any individual in person or certain groups, segments of social, public and moral life of the country and affects the integrity of India, the President and the judiciary.
The programme code provided by the Rules is exhaustive. The Act empowers the government to restrict operation of any cable network it thinks is necessary or expedient to do so in public interest. It further, observed, "Giving inducement to a person to commit an offence, which he is otherwise not likely and inclined to commit, so as to make the same part of the sting operation is deplorable and must be deprecated by all concerned including the media. It remarked that such inducement tests infringe upon the individual's right to privacy. The court proposed a set of guidelines to be followed by news channels and electronic media in carrying out sting operations.
The guidelines direct a channel proposing to telecast a sting operation to obtain a certificate from the person who recorded or produced the same certifying that the operation is genuine to his knowledge. The guidelines propose that the Ministry of Information and Broadcasting should set up a committee which would have the powers to grant permission for telecasting sting operations.
The permission to telecast a sting operation should be granted by the committee only if it is satisfied about the overriding public interest to telecast the sting operation. However, the court failed to define what constitutes 'larger public interest'. The PCI norms also lay down similar guidelines which require a newspaper reporting a sting operation to obtain a certificate from the person involved in the sting to certify that the operation is genuine and record in writing the various stages of the sting.
The decision to report the sting vests with the editor who merely needs to satisfy himself that the sting operation is of public interest. The Code of Ethics provides guiding principles relating to privacy and sting operations that broadcasters should follow. Associated Broadcasting Company Pvt. NBA in its judgement held that the Broadcaster had violated clauses on privacy, sting operations and sex and nudity of the Code of Ethics.
It further, observed, that the Broadcaster and the story did not reveal any justifiable public interest in using the sting operation and violating the privacy of individuals. However, the news report, as NBSA observed, did not prove any criminality and was merely a sensational report of gay culture allegedly prevalent in Hyderabad. It was in the s, that the first sting operation on how women were being trafficked was carried out by the Indian Express reporter Ashwin Sarin. As part of the sting, the Express purchased a tribal girl called Kamla.
Subsequently, in , the sting operation conducted by Tehelka exposed corruption in defence contracts using spy cams and journalists posing as arms dealers. Sting operations gained legitimacy in India, especially in the aftermath of the Tehelka operation, exposing corruption within the government.
The original purpose of a sting operation or an undercover operation was to expose corruption. Stings were justifiable only when it served a public interest. Further, stings by Tehelka, where the newspaper used sex workers to entrap politicians have brought to question the manner in which stings are operated. Although, the overriding concern surrounding sting operations has been its authenticity, as opposed to, the issue of personal privacy.
For instance, in March a television news channel carried out a sting operation involving Bollywood actor Shakti Kapoor to expose the casting couch phenomenon in the movie industry. The video showing Shakti Kapoor asking for sexual favours from an aspiring actress, who was an undercover reporter, was received with public outrage. Nonetheless, prominent members of the media questioned the manner in which the sting was conducted. The sting was set up as an entrapment. The court has taken a strong view against the use of entrapment in sting operations. In the case of the Shakti Kapoor sting, privacy of the actor was clearly violated.
The manner in which the sting was conducted casts serious doubt on who was the victim. Additionally, the sting violated the PCI norms. It failed to provide a record of the various stages of how the sting operation was conducted. In United Kingdom, the media when violating privacy of a person has to demonstrate that it is in the interest of the public. The PCC has put down code of ethics to be followed by journalists. This includes photographing individuals in private places without their consent.
Interestingly, private places include public or private property "where there is a reasonable expectation of privacy. Like the PCI norms, the PCC Code lays down guidelines to follow when reporting on minors below 16 years of age who have been victims of sexual assault. As per the guidelines, the identity of the children should be protected. Further, relatives or friends of persons convicted or accused of a crime should not be identified without their consent, unless the information is relevant to the story.
For instance, the media reportage of the TISS rape case, which revealed the nationality and colour of the victim, would be in violation of the PCC Code. As far as sting operations are concerned, the PCC lays down that the press must not publish material acquired by hidden camera or clandestine devices by intercepting private messages, emails or telephone calls without consent. However, revealing private information in cases of public interest is an exception to the general rule to be followed with respect to individual privacy. The PCC defines public interest to include, but it is not restricted to:.
It requires editors to amply demonstrate that a publication is of public interest. In case the material is already in public domain the same rules of privacy do not apply. However, in cases involving children below 16 years of age, editors must demonstrate exceptional public interest that overrides the interest of the child. Tellingly, the PCC recognises freedom of expression as public interest. The PCC, to ensure that persons are not hounded by the media have started issuing desist orders. The PCC issues a desist notice to editors to prevent the media from contacting the person.
The PCC, however, does not have the powers to prevent publication. Further, United Kingdom is a member of the European Convention on Human Rights ECHR , which guarantees the right to privacy under Article 8 of the Convention: " Everyone has the right to respect for his private and family life, his home and his correspondence.
Freedom of the press - Wikiquote
However, there is no independent law which recognises the right to privacy. In the Russian Federation federal programmes of protecting and strengthening the health of the population shall be financed by the State; measures shall be adopted to develop state, municipal and private health services; activities shall be promoted which facilitate the strengthening of health, the development of physical culture and sport, ecological and sanitary-epidemiological well-being. The concealment by officials of the facts and circumstances posing a threat to the life and health of people shall entail responsibility according to the federal law.
Everyone shall have the right to favourable environment, reliable information about its state and for a restitution of damage inflicted on his health and property by ecological transgressions. Guarantees shall be provided for general access to and free pre-school, secondary and high vocational education in state or municipal educational establishments and at enterprises.
Everyone shall have the right to receive on a competitive basis a free higher education in a state or municipal educational establishment and at an enterprise. The basic general education shall be free of charge. Parents or persons in law parents shall enable their children to receive a basic general education. The Russian Federation shall establish federal state educational standards and support various forms of education and self-education.
Everyone shall be guaranteed the freedom of literary, artistic, scientific, technical and other types of creative activity, and teaching. Intellectual property shall be protected by law. Everyone shall have the right to participate in cultural life and use cultural establishments and to an access to cultural values. Everyone shall be obliged to care for the preservation of cultural and historical heritage and protect monuments of history and culture. State protection of the rights and freedoms of man and citizen shall be guaranteed in the Russian Federation. Decisions and actions or inaction of bodies of state authority and local self-government, public associations and officials may be appealed against in court.
Everyone shall have the right to appeal, according to international treaties of the Russian Federation, to international bodies for the protection of human rights and freedoms, if all the existing internal state means of legal protection have been exhausted.
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No one may be deprived of the right to the consideration of his or her case in that court and by that judge in whose cognizance the given case is according to law. The accused of committing a crime shall have the right to the examination of his case by a court of jury in cases envisaged by the federal law. Everyone shall be guaranteed the right to qualified legal assistance. In cases envisaged by law the legal assistance shall be free.
Any person detained, taken into custody, accused of committing a crime shall have the right to receive assistance of a lawyer counsel for the defence from the moment of detention, confinement in custody or facing charges accordingly. Everyone accused of committing a crime shall be considered innocent until his guilt is proved according to the rules fixed by the federal law and confirmed by the sentence of a court which has come into legal force.
In administering justice it shall not be allowed to use evidence received by violating the federal law. Everyone convicted for a crime shall have the right to appeal against the judgement of a superior court according to the rules envisaged by the federal law, as well as to ask for pardon or a mitigation of punishment. No one shall be obliged to give incriminating evidence, husband or wife and close relatives the range of whom is determined by the federal law. The rights of victims of crimes and of abuse of office shall be protected by law.
The State shall provide access to justice for them and a compensation for sustained damage. Everyone shall have the right for a state compensation for damages caused by unlawful actions inaction of bodies of state authority and their officials. No one may bear responsibility for the action which was not regarded as a crime when it was committed. If after violating law the responsibility for that is eliminated or mitigated, a new law shall be applied. The listing in the Constitution of the Russian Federation of the fundamental rights and freedoms shall not be interpreted as a rejection or derogation of other universally recognized human rights and freedoms.
In the Russian Federation no laws shall be adopted cancelling or derogating human rights and freedoms. The rights and freedoms of man and citizen may be limited by the federal law only to such an extent to which it is necessary for the protection of the fundamental principles of the constitutional system, morality, health, the rights and lawful interests of other people, for ensuring defence of the country and security of the State. In conditions of a state of emergency in order to ensure the safety of citizens and the protection of the constitutional system and in accordance with the federal constitutional law certain limitations may be placed on human rights and freedoms with the establishment of their framework and time period.
A state of emergency may be introduced in the whole territory of the Russian Federation and in its certain parts in case there are circumstances and according to the rules fixed by the federal constitutional law. The rights and freedoms envisaged in Articles 20 , 21 , 23 the first part , 24 , 28 , 34 the first part , 40 the first part , of the Constitution of the Russian Federation, shall not be liable to limitations.
Everyone shall be obliged to pay the legally established taxes and dues. Laws introducing new taxes or deteriorating the position of taxpayers may not have retroactive effect. Everyone shall be obliged to preserve nature and the environment, carefully treat the natural wealth.